Roosevelt, for an American-Ottoman war. Selçuk Esenbel, professor emeritus at Boğaziçi University, then illustrated the important role played by Japanese representatives, another British ally that nonetheless remained neutral towards the Ottoman Empire, in mediating relations with the defeated Ottoman government and providing a channel through which to enter discussions with the resurgent Turkish national movement in Anatolia.

David S. Katz, a professor at Tel Aviv University, spoke about Arnold J. Toynbee, whose relief work saved many lives and whose newspaper articles helped push public opinion in favour of Turkey. It was on his way home, travelling on the Orient Express, that Toynbee had the idea of how to organise what would become his famous *A Study of History*, the dozen volumes which made him a household name throughout the English-speaking world, put him on the cover of *Time* magazine and ultimately led to him being crowned by the popular press as the greatest historian of his day. Matthew Ghazarian, a doctoral student at Columbia University, and Ozan Arslan, a professor at Izmir University of Economics, both presented on the Caucasus, one of the most complex theatres of the latter part of the war, where Bolshevik, White Russian, Ottoman, British, Armenian and Georgian forces variously held and lost ground. Arslan provided a detailed account of Ottoman expansion into the space ceded by post-revolutionary Russia and how ambitions in Central Asia, like those in Egypt discussed by Çiçek, were supported through sectarian propagandising. Ghazarian showed how control of the region's important oil resources drove events, if in a rather unexpected way, with the obstruction of exports rather than the extraction of resources seeming to motivate imperial policies.

## Rethinking 'radicalisation' in regional and global politics

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At the 2014 UK Political Studies Association conference in Manchester we co-organised a panel series titled 'Radicalization and transformation in southeastern Europe'. Our experience there encouraged us to expand this research theme into a special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* in May 2016 (issue 24.2). During a period when the brunt of political science scholarship seemingly focuses on radicalisation only as a security threat or as a process inescapably intertwined with Islamic fundamentalism, we chose to explore its neglected aspects. To do this we adopted Christian de Vito's definition that sees radicalisation as 'a shift in the contents and/or forms of contention that, in relation to previous contents and/or forms of contention, is perceived as an escalation by (some) historical agents and/or by external observers' (De Vito 2014: 72).

We invited colleagues working on southeastern Europe (Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania) to expand on their panel presentations and reflect more deeply on the type of 'radicalisation' their case studies reflected. The cases included the intervention of the 'anti-capitalist Muslims' group during the Gezi Park protests, the anti-austerity movement in Greece, the anti-corruption rallies in Bulgaria, the absence of radical politics in today's Albania and a comparison of the Turkish and Greek state responses to eruptions of civil discontent and protests between 2008 and 2013. Through these cases we show that radicalisation in politics can be seen as a process of intensification of existing forms of political engagement within liberal democracies by both society and state actors. This intensification can have negative (the shrinking of democratic rule and the rise of state violence) as well as positive (the creativity involved in forms of social disobedience and the reversal of political apathy) effects. Hence, we argue that what determines whether radicalisation is progressive or conservative, productive or disastrous for democratic politics is the specific character and content of such an intensification. This stands in sharp contrast to the dominant approach that sees radicalisation as a mainly 'external' threat to liberal democracy or a kind of cancerous cell within it.

Our suggestion of treating radicalisation as a 'form' instead of connecting it a priori with a negative or positive content can be helpful as a means of examining contemporary developments within the region and beyond. For instance, this approach can be used for the examination of contradictions of liberal democracy at the inter- or supra-state level, moving away from the focus on the nation-state by pointing to the illiberal intensification of governance orders emanating from transnational institutions like the EU, NATO, the IMF or the World Bank. The growing legitimacy crisis of the EU can be examined as a crisis involving the radicalisation of a neo-nationalist logic affecting its core mechanisms and pushing the union to act increasingly as a cloak for the vested interests of primarily Germany and the EU-north, particularly in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. This logic is now seemingly expanding to many Baltic member-states, which

Holding a half-hour sit in every Saturday on Istanbul's Istiklal Street for more than 20 years now, the 'Saturday Mothers' protest against the disappearance of loved ones during the 1980s and 1990s in Turkey (photo by leon_eye)

are refusing to comply with the union's constitutive principle of problem-sharing (this time in regards to the refugee crisis and refugee resettlement across the EU).

On the other hand, one can see radicalisation also in the intensification of emancipatory practices resulting from the refugee crisis moment. Societal networks of solidarity mobilised quickly in response across different countries, while states, governments and official organisations seemed clueless and slow to respond. One needs to consider here that many sub-state actors such as international NGOs and aid agencies all too often acquiesce too easily to their main donors' geopolitical agendas and shape their programmes according to these. For instance, Pamela DeLargy (2016: 6) highlights the reluctance of aid organisations to respond to the grim conditions at the refugee camp in Calais to avoid angering donor governments while being active in Darfur or Mosul. In this respect, the 'radicalisation' of trans-European solidarity movements not co-opted into or resisting these long-term geopolitical strategies and interests presents a landscape of potential for much-needed political change in relation to the refugee crisis. Of course, this radicalisation at the grass-roots level is not without the dangers of attracting groups with reactionary, xenophobic or repressive agendas.

During times when intensified complexity reigns over sociopolitical phenomena due to the dense interconnections between local, regional and global politics, treating radicalisation as a form means understanding such phenomena more clearly and providing the tools for distinguishing between radicalisation that can be dangerous and that which can be beneficial for democratic politics.

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A British participant in an aid convoy to the Calais refugee camp, June 2016 (photo by Alisdare Hickson used under a creative commons license: https://flic.kr/p/HmiVTy)

**Remembering displacement as a means of reconciliation? Towards a comparative approach**


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Achieving success in reconciliation efforts is far from a linear process. This is especially so in the case of *historical conflicts* where long-enduring mutually negative perceptions reign. Turkish-Greek or Turkish-Armenian relations are paradigmatic of this. In cases like these, the ability to overcome the effects of prejudice and mistrust qualifies as one of the most important preconditions for solving bilateral disputes. Therefore, the creation of *empathy* across societies stands, rightfully, as a widely recognised criterion for the success of reconciliation initiatives (Çuhada, Gültekin-Punsmann 2012: 42). *Displacement*, on the other hand, has been an effect of such historical conflicts, carrying a heavy emotional/affective load and linking the past to the present. Memories of displacement are not abstract. They are often based on real experiences of personal, family or community pain and loss, and they are transmitted from generation to generation. Furthermore, the material traces of displacement (the leaving behind of the family house and the village mosque or church, etc.) appear as reminders of a painful past.

This short article examines some of the issues regarding the comparability of reconciliation processes and the possible uses of such a comparison, with examples drawn from the Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Armenian cases. More specifically, it looks at some prospects and challenges of rethinking displacement and its affectiveness as a means of reconciliation.

*Displacement as mutual trauma in the history of Turkish-Greek relations*

The two-way flow of people between Greece and Turkey in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, both in the form of irregular, violence-ridden displacement and as an organised population exchange, represents one of the largest forced movements of people in contemporary European history. Until recently, in both Turkey and Greece the historical burden of this past of collective pain, exile and loss was the source of competing national narratives of victimhood, rightfulness and blame. It fed national traumas and stimulated collective (but different in each case) 'symptoms'.

In the Turkish case, the symptoms took the form of a *collective forgetting.* Muslim refugee populations from the Balkans, the Aegean islands and Crete were expected to symbolically erase their connections to places of family origin and block their memories of loss (of lands, of people, of roots) in favour of solidifying their links and affiliation to their new nation state (Iğsiz 2008: 451). Public memory of these 'origins' or commemoration of such links remained taboo for almost 100 years after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.